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NOTES AND COMMENTS
HARMLESS ERROR: THE NEED FOR A
UNIFORM STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
The harmless error doctrine enables an appellate court to af-
firm a criminal conviction despite errors committed by the trial
court, provided that the defendant was not prejudiced.' Implicit in
the doctrine is a recognition that "[a] defendant is entitled to a fair
trial but not a perfect one."'2 Thus, when error is not of constitu-
tional magnitude, it is usually deemed harmless if it does not "affect
the substantial rights of the parties."'3 A more stringent standard
has developed, however, for appellate review of criminal convictions
tainted by violations of federal constitutional rights. In such cir-
cumstances, the Supreme Court has determined that constitutional
errors may be deemed harmless only when an appellate court can
declare a belief "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error com-
plained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."4
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976); CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 13: ALASKA R. CRIM. PRoc.
47(a) (1968); COLO. R. CRIM. PRec. 52(a) (1977); cf. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2725.2 (1977 Repl.
Vol.) (fair trial provided); VA. CODE § 8-483 (1957 Repl. Vol.) (substantial justice attained).
2 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (quoting Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953)); see Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 232 (1973). See generally
C. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 183 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976); N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAW § 470.05(1) (McKinney 1971).
' Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,
372 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 428 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250, 251 (1969); Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596 (1968) (per curiam). In Chapman,
the leading case on harmless constitutional error, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some
errors "are so basic to a fair trial" that they require automatic reversal. 386 U.S. at 23 & n.8
(citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)) (right to counsel at trial); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (coerced confessions); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)
(impartial judge). One commentator has argued that an automatic reversal rule would
effectively control judicial and prosecutorial misconduct. It is suggested, however, that police
officers probably would not be as effectively deterred, since they view their primary duty not
as obtaining valid convictions, but as arresting criminals and preventing crime. Comment,
Principles for Application of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 616, 626 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Harmless Error Standard]; see F. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS
REVOLUTON 130-52 (1970). See generally Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The
Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 240-42 (1962).
Although the Chapman opinion did not attempt to present the full range of errors which
might require automatic reversal, several means have been suggested by which such errors
may be identified. One proposal suggests that if an error affects the integrity of the guilt
determination process, automatic reversal is warranted. Note, Harmless Constitutional
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In attempting to fashion concrete and workable tests to imple-
ment these broad definitions of harmlessness, appellate courts have
developed several methods of assessing error. First, an appellate
court may evaluate the effect of the error without regard to the
untainted evidence in the case. Thus, if the error in the abstract is
prejudicial, reversal is required.5 A second way for determining
harmlessness is to view the error in relation to the other evidence
in the case. Under this approach, the error will be found harmless
if there is no "reasonable possibility that [it] . . . contributed to
the conviction." 6 A third method deems an error harmless when it
Error, 20 STAN. L. REv. 83, 89 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Harmless Constitutional Error].
In addition to the errors listed by the Chapman Court, it has been argued that violations of
any rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, with the exception of evidence seized in violation
of the fourth amendment, should require automatic reversal. Id. at 88-95. Another commenta-
tor has suggested that automatic reversal should occur where the error is inherently prejudi-
cial, undermines deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct, or undermines respect for the judi-
cial system. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. REV. 519, 538-57 (1969). Errors which are inherently prejudicial
include those involving the impartiality of jury or judge. Id. at 540-43. When there is racial
discrimination in the selection of jurors, for example, automatic reversal is desirable, since
the prejudicial impact is not readily ascertainable. Mause, supra, at 542. Likewise, Professor
Mause argues that admission into evidence of prior convictions is inherently prejudicial. Id.
at 545-46. He also suggests that constitutional errors caused by prosecutorial misconduct
should result in automatic reversal only when the prosecutor knowingly causes the error. Id.
at 553; see, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of evidence favorable to
defense); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (knowing use of perjured
testimony by prosecutor). The author concludes that, in the long run, an automatic reversal
standard may be appropriate for all constitutional errors. Mause, supra, at 557.
A third proposal would create an automatic reversal rule when the constitutional right
infringed is fundamental. See Harmless Error Standard, supra, at 620. Whether a right is
fundamental depends upon the extent to which it is explicitly recognized by the Constitution,
the importance accorded the right as indicated by statute and the judiciary's historical
attitude toward the right. Id. at 621-25. The right-to-counsel provision of the sixth amend-
ment provides an illustration of the author's "explicitness" requirement. In the author's view,
since the right to the assistance of counsel at trial is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution,
see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), a rule
of automatic reversal should apply when this right is infringed. As the right to counsel has
been extended to critical pretrial proceedings, see, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967), the right has become "less explicit" and, therefore, should not fall within an auto-
matic reversal rule. Harmless Error Standard, supra, at 622. A constitutional right is also
fundamental to the extent that it is reflected in congressional statutory policy. Under this
approach, reversal is required if the defendant establishes a violation of a right granted by
federal legislation. Id. at 623. See also Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701 (4th Cir. 1978).
It also has been suggested that the automatic reversal rule should be applied to any error
which "bias[esi the machinery for bringing evidence before the jury." Note, Harmless
Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 HARv. L. REV. 814, 820 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Reappraisal]. See generally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Cameron
& Osborn, When Harmless Error Isn't Harmless, 1971 L. & Soc. ORD. 23.
See notes 113-115 and accompanying text infra.
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963); see notes 116-125 and accompanying
text infra.
HARMLESS ERROR
is merely cumulative of other evidence in the case.' Finally, if over-
whelming evidence of a defendant's guilt exists when the error is
excised from the record, the error may be deemed harmless.'
This Note will review and evaluate the rules regarding constitu-
tional error as established by the Supreme Court and implemented
by the appellate courts of New York. The separate rules which gov-
ern nonconstitutional error in the federal courts and New York's
state courts will be discussed in a similar manner. The Note will
conclude by examining the desirability and feasibility of adopting
one standard of review for all errors in criminal cases, whether con-
stitutional or nonconstitutional in nature.
HARMLESS CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR
Development of Harmless Constitutional Error in the Supreme
Court
At common law, the English "Exchequer Rule" mandated re-
versal for any trial error no matter how slight or insignificant? This
rule, widely followed by American courts,"0 was criticized because
it encouraged counsel to inject error into trials and resulted in ex-
pense and delay for the parties and the courts." As criminal trials
7 See notes 106-112 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 95-105 and accompanying text infra.
'See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 4-12; 1 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 367 (3d ed.
1940). Prior to the Exchequer Rule, trial error was not reversible if the entire record contained
sufficient evidence to support the verdict and the correct result was attained. See R. TRAYNOR,
supra note 4, at 7-10; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 21, at 365-67. When the Exchequer Rule was
enunciated in Crease v. Barrett, 1 C.M.&R. 919, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835), the Court of
Exchequer noted that an automatic reversal rule would deter breaches of the rules of evidence
and prevent appellate courts from impinging upon the function of the jury. Id. at 933, 149
Eng. Rep. at 1359. This reasoning was criticized severely by Professor Wigmore, who saw the
rules of evidence as "mere instruments of investigation," which could not be justified as "an
end in themselves." 1 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 21, at 369. Furthermore, in Professor Wigmore's
view, the usurpation of the jury function was not a serious objection to the traditional rule,
since appellate courts frequently weigh evidence in determining whether a verdict is sup-
ported by the facts. Id. § 21, at 369-70. Similarly, Justice Traynor has stated: "If the court is
convinced upon review of the evidence that the error did not influence the jury, and hence
sustains the verdict, a fortiori there is no invasion of the province of the jury." R. TRAYNOR,
supra note 4, at 13. Professor Wigmore was persuaded that the practical effect of the Excheq-
uer Rule was "to increase the delay and expense of litigation, to encourage defiant criminality
and oppression, and to foster the spirit of litigious gambling." 1 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 21, at
370. For a discussion of the evolution of the harmless error rule in England, see Saltzburg,
The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988, 1002 n.45 (1973).
II L. ORFELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 190-97 (1939); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at
13-14; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 21, at 367-68, 373.
" See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 4-12; 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, supra note 9, § 21, at
1979]
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became "a game for sowing reversible error in the record,"'" a reform
movement was spurred by the legal profession, 3 leading to the adop-
tion of harmless error statutes at the federal 4 and state levels. 5
These statutes were designed to eliminate reversals based solely
upon "technical errors or defects which [did] not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the parties." 6 Despite the prevalence and popular-
ity of harmless error statutes, most commentators believed that
automatic reversal was required in any case involving the violation
of a right guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. 7 This view
seemed to be shared by the Supreme Court which, with only one
exception," reversed convictions without regard to whether the con-
12 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 (1946).
11 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 14; see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. at 758-59
nn.10 & 14; 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 21, at 392-95; Hadley, OUTLIm OF CODE OF CRUMNAL
PROCEDURE, 12 A.B.A.J. 690 (1926); Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP., pt. 1, 395 (1906); Wigmore, Criminal Procedure:
"Good" Reversals and "Bad" Reversals, 4 ILL. L. REV. 352 (1909).
" See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 14. The federal harmless error rule for nonconstitu-
tional error is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976) and FED. R. CRim. P. 52 (a). Section 2111
states: "On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give
judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not
affect the substantial rights of the parties." 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976); see Saltzburg, supra note
9, at 1006 n.57 (1973). The first federal harmless error statute was enacted in 1919 and re-
enacted in substantially the same form in 1949; the statute has remained in force since 1949.
11 All 50 states now have statutes or rules governing harmless error. See Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). See also ALI, OFICIAL DRAFT OF THE CODE OF CRmAINAL
PROCEDURE 1302-04 (1930); Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 Tsx. L. REv. 126,
146-48 (1927).
11 N.Y. CalM. PROc. LAW § 470.05(1) (McKinney 1971); see note 14 supra. New York's
statutory treatment of harmless error is typical of the standard used in many jurisdictions.
The state's first harmless error statute was applicable only to crimes which were punishable
by death or life imprisonment. Ch. 337, § 3, [1855] N.Y. Laws 613. Under this statute, an
appellate court was able to grant a new trial if the verdict "was against the weight of the
evidence or against the law" or when "justice required a new trial." Id. When the Code of
Criminal Procedure was enacted in 1881, it contained a harmless error section applicable to
all cases without regard to the crime charged. The statute provided: "After hearing the
appeal, the court must give judgment, without regard to technical errors or defects -or to
exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Ch. 4, § 542, [1881]
N.Y. Laws 104 (vol. 2). See generally 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 21, at 387-88. This
standard was re-enacted in slightly modified forul with the adoption of the Criminal Proce-
dure Law which went into effect on September 1, 1971. Ch. 996, § 1, [1970] N.Y. Laws 3117.
11 See, e.g., Gibbs, Prejudicial Error: Admissions and Exclusions of Evidence in the
Federal Courts, 3 VIL. L. REV. 48, 67 (1957); Manwaring, California and the Fourth
Amendment, 16 STAN. L. REV. 318, 326 (1954); Note, The Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 450, 461 (1947).
1 In Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), the Court concluded that the erroneous
admission of a statement in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses against him was harmless "when in effect [the defendant] stated under oath that
he was guilty of the charge preferred against him." Id. at 476. Motes was the only case prior
to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), in which the Supreme Court applied the
harmless error doctrine to a constitutional violation.
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stitutional error prejudiced the defendant. 9 Nevertheless, neither
the courts nor the commentators advanced a satisfactory theory to
explain why constitutional error could never be harmless.
20
The concept of harmless constitutional error was expressly rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in Chapman v. California21 wherein
," The Supreme Court reversed convictions where counsel was denied at trial or at an-
other critical stage, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437 (1948); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (per curiam); Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U.S. 471 (1945), where the trial judge was not impartial, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927), where a defendant's coerced confession was introduced at trial, e.g., Haynes v. Wash-
ington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49
(1949), where conviction was based on an unconstitutional statute, Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931), where an unconstitutional presumption was included in jury instructions,
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946), where pretrial publicity saturated
the community in which the trial was held, Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); cf.
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (pretrial publicity and disruptions by press at trial
necessitate reversal), where the right to a speedy trial was denied, Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967), where intentional discrimination occurred in selection of grand and petit
jurors, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Coleman v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 129 (1964),
and where the right to cross-examine the prosecution's witness was denied, Douglas v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court, however, never
unequivocally stated that automatic reversal is required in every case involving constitutional
error. In Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), the Court noted in dictum that
the harmless error rule is applicable to all errors "except perhaps where the departure is from
a constitutional norm," id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted), and cited, as examples, cases where
coerced confessions were introduced at trial or the defendant was denied the right to represent
himself at trial, id. at 765 n.19. This dictum is not necessarly inconsistent with the harmless
constitutional error doctrine enunciated in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), since
forced confessions and denial of the right to counsel are constitutional errors which should
be subject to automatic reversal. Id. at 23 & n.8.
11 In Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), the Supreme Court proferred an explan-
ation for automatic reversal when an admission made by the defendant was erroneously
allowed into evidence:
If found to have been illegally admitted, reversible error will result, since the prose-
cution cannot on the one hand offer evidence to prove guilt, and which by the very
offer is vouched for as tending to that end, and on the other hand for the purpose
of avoiding the consequences of the error, caused by its wrongful admission, be
heard to assert that the matter offered as a confession was not prejudicial because
it did not tend to prove guilt.
Id. at 541.
21 386 U.S. 18 (1967). The defendants in Chapman were convicted following a trial in
which both defendants refused to testify. At the time of the trial, the California Constitution
allowed the prosecutor to comment upon a defendant's refusal to take the stand, and permit-
ted the jury to infer guilt from his refusal. Id. at 19. Making use of this provision, the
prosecutor in Chapman made numerous references in his summation to the defendants'
silence, id. at 26-43 (app.), and the trial court informed the jurors that they were entitled to
draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant's failure to testify. Id. at 19 & n.2. After the
trial, the Supreme Court held in an unrelated case that the California practice violated a
defendant's rights under the fifth amendment. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court refused to overturn the Chapman defendants'
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the Court stated that some constitutional errors may be so
"unimportant and insignificant" within the context of a given case
that they could be deemed harmless without offending constitu-
tional principles.12 Holding that a state's harmless error rule is in-
applicable to "infractions by the States of federally guaranteed
rights," the Chapman Court enunciated a federal standard for re-
viewing the effect of trial errors of constitutional magnitude.2 The
Court ruled that a constitutional violation may be deemed harmless
only when the court is convinced that "it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. '24 Attempting to formulate more precise guide-
lines, the Court rejected tests that place .excessive emphasis on the
quantum of untainted evidence presented at trial and stated that
the proper inquiry is " 'whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the [tainted] evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction.' "25 The Chapman decision has been interpreted as
indicating that, in evaluating constitutional error, an appellate
court should focus solely on the tainted evidence. 21 Under this inter-
conviction, finding no "miscarriage of justice" under the state's harmless error rule. People
v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P.2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965).
12 386 U.S. at 22.
21 Id. at 21. The Court noted that "in the absence of appropriate congressional action, it
[is the Court's] responsibility to protect [a defendant's constitutional rights]." Id. Thus,
the harmless constitutional error doctrine is apparently subject to change by the Congress.
See id. at 46-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 38; Harmless Con-
stitutional Error, supra note 4, at 88 n.40; note 126 infra. The Court previously has pre-
scribed rules binding on the states, but "encouraged] Congress and the States to continue
their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of . . . [the] criminal laws." Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
1 386 U.S. at 24. The terms "contribute to the conviction," "contribute to the verdict,"
and "affecting the jurors" possess the same meaning and are used interchangeably through-
out this Note. There is no indication in the Supreme Court opinions that these phrases have
different connotations. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963); Oral
Argument in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), reprinted in 5 CRIM. L. REP. 4033,
4035 (1969).
386 U.S. at 23 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963)). The Chapman
Court cited Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), wherein the Court reserved for future
consideration the question whether constitutional error could ever be harmless. Id. at 86.
Although the Fahy Court reversed a conviction apparently on the narrow ground that the
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors misapplied the state's harmless error rule, see id. at
91-92; Harmless Constitutional Error, supra note 4, at 86-87, the Court did state that if "there
is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the
conviction," the error cannot be harmless, 375 U.S. at 86-87. Recalling this language, the
Chapman Court stated: "There is little, if any, difference between . . . [the statement in
Fahy] and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 386 U.S. at
24.
2' Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need
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pretation, the tainted evidence is viewed in isolation and is not
weighed against the untainted evidence in determining whether the
error was harmless.? Thus, if the error standing alone is highly
prejudicial, it can never be viewed as harmless.? This interpretation
of Chapman, however, has not been borne out by later decisions.
Subsequently, in Harrington v. California,29 the Court consid-
ered the effect of a denial of a defendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation under the rule established in Bruton v. United
States.3" While expressly reaffirming Chapman, Justice Douglas,
writing for the majority, concluded that the direct evidence of guilt
presented at Harrington's trial was so overwhelming that, unless the
Court was to apply an automatic reversal rule to constitutional
violations, the error must be considered harmless.3 1 Although it
found that the erroneously admitted material was merely cumula-
tive of other evidence, the Court expressly rejected a test which
would result in a finding of harmlessness when the error is found
simply to corroborate untainted evidence in the case.2
Harrington is susceptible to being interpreted as a sub silentio
overruling of Chapman and an unqualified adoption of the less de-
of A Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15, 26 (1976).
" See id. at 17-19.
23 The facts in People v. Cotter, 63 Cal. 2d 386, 405 P.2d 862, 46 Cal. Rptr. 622 (1965),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Cotter v. California, 386 U.S. 274 (1967) (per curiam), may
be used to illustrate the effects of a strict interpretation of Chapman. In Cotter, a total of
seven incriminating statements were introduced into evidence. The last three statements
were admitted in contravention of the rules established in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). The Cotter court held the error harmless, since the inadmissible statements were
cumulative of the other statements. 63 Cal. 2d at 398, 405 P.2d at 869, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 629.
Had the court applied a strict version of the Chapman test, however, focusing solely on the
tainted evidence, the admission of the statements in Cotter could not have been harmless.
- 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
" 391 U.S. 123 (1968), discussed in Note, Bruton v. United States: A Belated Look at
the Warren Court Concept of Criminal Justice, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 54 (1969). The defen-
dant in Harrington was tried with three codefendants for murder. During the trial, the
codefendants' confessions, which implicated Harrington, were admitted into evidence. Only
one codefendant, however, took the stand and submitted to cross-examination. 395 U.S. at
252. The admission of the other two confessions, therefore, denied Harrington his right of
confrontation. The Bruton Court had held that the admission of a defendant's confession
which incriminates his codefendant is a violation of the codefendant's sixth amendment right
of confrontation if the confessing defendant does not take the stand. 391 U.S. at 137. The
Bruton rule is binding on the states under Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), which
held the confrontation clause applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
" 395 U.S. at 254. The confessions of the two codefendants who did not take the stand
placed Harrington at the scene of the crime, a fact which Harrington himself admitted.
Additionally, the codefendant who took the stand and other witnesses placed Harrington at
the scene of the crime and testified that he actively participated in the crime. Id. at 252-54.
32 Id. at 254.
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manding "overwhelming evidence" test.3 3 Upon a closer reading,
however, the decisions may be reconciled. In Chapman, the only
evidence proving the defendant's guilt was circumstantial.3' On the
other hand, in Harrington, there was direct untainted evidence,
including the defendant's own statements, which established the
same facts as did the erroneously admitted confessions.3 5 Thus, the
Harrington Court was not required to speculate on the inferences
drawn by the jury in reaching its verdict and could readily conclude
that the error played an insignificant part in the prosecution's case.
As implied by Chapman and Harrington, the courts should distin-
guish between direct and circumstantial evidence, since the type of
untainted evidence presented is relevant to a consideration of its
probative value.-6
Like Chapman, Harrington suggests that overwhelming evi-
dence should not be overemphasized in determining harmlessness.
The presence of overwhelming evidence is significant, however,
See id. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Harrington,
Justice Brennan argued vigorously that the majority had shifted the focus of the Court's
inquiry from an assessment of the error's impact on the jury to an evaluation of the amount
of untainted evidence in the case. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was con-
cerned that the adoption of an overwhelming evidence test, see notes 95-105 and accompany-
ing text infra, would significantly undermine the deterrent effect of such decisions as Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure),
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting comments regarding defendant's si-
lence), Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (excluding statements elicited prior to notice
of rights), United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (excluding in-court identification of
defendant when based on lineup or showup without counsel present), and Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (prohibiting admission of codefendant's confession where codefen-
dant does not testify). 395 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent
maintained that an overwhelming evidence test would, in effect, leave enforcement of impor-
tant constitutional rights in the hands of the trial courts. Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
386 U.S. at 25. In examining the facts in Chapman, the Court observed that although
there was "a reasonably strong 'circumstantial web of evidence,' . . . it was also a case in
which, absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might
very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts." Id. at 25-26 (citation omitted) (quoting People
v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 197, 404 P.2d 209, 220, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729, 740 (1965), rev'd sub nom.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
11 395 U.S. at 252-54. The Harrington Court stated that "[tihe case. . .was not woven
from circumstantial evidence. [The evidence] is so overwhelming that . . . we must leave
this state conviction undisturbed." Id. at 254.
" See Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596 (1968) (per curiam); United States v.
Gonzalez, 555 F.2d 308, 317 (2d Cir. 1977); Chase v. Crisp, 523 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976); United States v. Mancino, 468 F.2d 1350, 1353-55 (8th Cir.
1972). See also United States v. Brown, 551 F.2d 639, 644 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Anderson, 523 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (5th Cir. 1975). Regarding the differences between direct
and circumstantial evidence at the trial level, Prbfessor Wigmore has stated that it is impossi-
ble "to make a general assertion ascribing greater weight to one class or the other." 1 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 26, at 401.
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since the greater the evidence of guilt, the less likely it is that the
error influenced the jury's decision. 7 Significantly, in Harrington,
both the majority and the dissent believed that the quantum of
untainted evidence should be a factor in determining whether con-
stitutional error is harmless.3 8 The majority appeared to place great
emphasis on overwhelming evidence of guilt, while the dissenters
expressed concern that the amount of untainted evidence would
become the decisive factor in determining harmlessness 9.3  Thus,
their disagreement apparently was related to the degree of emphasis
to be placed on the untainted evidence.
Unfortunately, the last major harmless constitutional error case
decided by the Supreme Court, Milton v. Wainwright,"0 did not
serve to clarify the problems posed by Chapman and Harrington.
The Milton Court was asked to decide whether statements elicited
by a police officer who had been planted in the defendant's jail cell
after his attorney had instructed him to remain silent were properly
obtained." Avoiding the constitutional question,42 the Court
examined the record, which inclded three untainted confessions
and other, "highly dainaging" evidence.43 On the basis of this
1 See notes 118-119 and accompanying text infra.
3 395 U.S. at 254; id. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Harrington majority noted
that the "weight of the evidence" is significant, id. at 254, while the dissent observed that
"[t]he focus of appellate inquiry should be on the character and quality of the tainted
evidence as it relates to the untainted evidence and not just on the amount of untainted
evidence." Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 256 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,0 407 U.S. 371 (1972).
' Several days after the defendant in Milton was arrested he confessed to the crime. In
the days that followed he clarified and added to his statement. In total, he made three
complete confessions. Thereafter, he obtained the assistance of an attorney and was advised
not to discuss his case with anyone. Id. at 373-75. While the defendant was in jail awaiting
trial, the state planted a police officer in his cell. Posing as a fellow prisoner, the officer
obtained additional incriminating statements from Milton. At trial, the officer testifed to
these statements. Id. at 375-76.
42 Id. at 372. The dissent in Milton strenously objected to the majority's refusal to
consider the right-to-counsel issue and argued that the manner in which the confession was
procured was a clear violation of the defendant's rights under Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932), and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 395 U.S. at 380-82 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). The dissent's position, it is submitted, is well taken. If the harmless error
doctrine is routinely invoked to avoid constitutional issues, the development of the case law
concerning substantive issues will be inhibited. The result could be inconsistency and in-
creased error at the trial level, since trial judges would be left without guidance on important
substantive questions. See Note, Application of the Harmless Error Doctrine to Violations of
Miranda: The California Experience, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 941, 951 (1971).
4 407 U.S. at 376. In addition to the confessions, there was a substantial amount of
circumstantial evidence, including the fact that the defendant was the beneficiary of the
victim's life insurance policies, testimony that the defendant told others he was interested
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record, the Court held that even if the admission of the illegally
obtained statement was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 44 With such overwhelming evidence of guilt, there was
"no reasonable doubt that the jury . . . would have reached the
same verdict without hearing [the officer's] testimony."4
Although Milton professed adherence to the harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt standard, a conflict with earlier decisions arises
from the Court's conclusion that the jury would have convicted the
defendant without having heard the tainted evidence." This ap-
proach differs markedly from that suggested in Harrington where
the majority stated that an appellate court should determine "the
probable impact of the [error] on the minds of the average jury. ' '4
Since the emphasis is on the impact of the tainted evidence, this
approach is consistent with the reasonable possibility test. In con-
trast, the Milton Court focused on whether the jury would have
convicted without the tainted evidence, which appears similar to an
overwhelming evidence test.48
only in the victim's money, and evidence that the doors of the car in which the victim
drowned were locked and could not have been locked accidentally. Id.
' The dissenters in Milton took a different view of the evidence. Finding the circumstan-
ces under which the defendant's other confessions were obtained somewhat questionable, the
dissent challenged the majority's estimation of the weight given to these confessions by the
jury. Since the jury rationally might have discounted the reliability of the "untainted" state-
ments, the dissent concluded that there was at least a reasonable possibility that the
"tainted" statement had a corroborative effect and contributed to the conviction. Id. at 383-
84 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The problem hinted at by the Milton dissent was illustrated in Schneble v. Florida, 405
U.S. 427 (1972), which was decided only a few months before Milton. The Schneble Court
found a violation of Bruton, see note 30 supra, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, although
the evidence against Schneble, in addition to his codefendant's statement, consisted primar-
ily of his confession. 405 U.S. at 428-31. The trial court determined in the first instance that
the confession was voluntary, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and instructed the
jury to disregard any part of the statement it believed to have been made involuntarily. 405
U.S. at 434 (Marshall, J., dissenting). While the majority viewed the inadmissible statements
as largely corroborative of Schneble's confession, it noted that the jury must have viewed the
confession as voluntary, since, aside from the confession, there was insufficient proof of guilt.
Id. at 431.
407 U.S. at 377.
' See id. at 377. Milton reached the Court on a petition of habeas corpus. The test
adopted by the Court which, in contrast to other tests, is likely to result in a finding of
harmlessness, may reflect a tendency to apply a more lenient standard when a harmless error
question comes before the Court on a habeas corpus petition than when error is reviewed on
direct appeal. Judge Friendly also favors an approach which utilizes different standards for
assessing error depending upon whether the appeal is direct or collateral. See Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant?-Collateral Attack oh Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 142, 157
n.81 (1970). See also Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 153-57 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976).
4 395 U.S. at 254.
" See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 523 F.2d 407, 409-10 & n.2 (2d Cir. 1975); Null v.
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Notwithstanding the uncertainty generated by the Chapman,
Harrington and Milton decisions, it remains clear that the
"harmlessness" of a trial error of constitutional magnitude must be
demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt." The apparent contradic-
tions in the Supreme Court's decisions may reflect the Court's at-
tempt to find a standard for measuring harmlessness which would
lead to consistent results.50 While it may be argued that the test for
harmlessness has changed,"1 it is also possible to conclude that the
decisions are an indication of the Court's reluctance to establish a
mechanical rule.2
Wainwright, 508 F.2d 340, 343 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 970 (1975). See also Bates v.
Nelson, 485 F.2d 90, 93-94 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960 (1974); Reappraisal,
supra note 4. Despite the many inconsistencies, the result in Milton may be reconciled with
those reached in Harrington and Chapman, since the case against Milton did not derive
entirely from circumstantial evidence, and the direct evidence of guilt arising from the un-
tainted confessions was highly damaging. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text supra.
11 See, e.g., Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372 (1972); Harrington v. California,
395 U.S. 250, 251 (1969); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
"' Chapman was criticized for not establishing a clear and practical standard. See, e.g.,
Mause, supra note 4, at 538-40; Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the
Myth of Harmless Error, 42 NOTRE D mE LAW. 457, 464 (1967); Reappraisal, supra note 4, at
815-17; Oral Argument in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), reprinted in 5
CaM. L. REP. 4033 (1969). Decisions in the lower federal courts support the contention that
the Court's opinions on harmless constitutional error have not produced a test capable of
yielding consistent results. Compare United States v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 268 n.1 (9th Cir.
1977), and United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1092 (1977), with United States v. Gonzalez, 555 F.2d 308, 316 (2d Cir. 1977), and United
States v. Hunt, 548 F.2d 268, 268-71 (9th Cir. 1977) (Sneed, J., dissenting). See generally
Field, supra note 26, at 15-36.
1' The inconsistencies in the Chapman, Harrington, and Milton decisions may be attrib-
utable to changes in the composition of the Court. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967), the majority consisted of Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark,
Brennan, White and Fortes with Justices Stewart concurring and Harlan dissenting: The
majority in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969), was comprised of Justices Black,
Douglas, Harlan, Stewart and White. The Chief Justice and Justices Brennan and Marshall
dissented. By the time Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), was decided, there were
four new justices on the Court. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist comprised the majority in Milton along with Justice White. The dissenters were
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall. Thus, it is conceivable that this change
of the Court's membership may have influenced the Milton Court's apparent preference for
the "overwhelming evidence" test. The change in the Court's composition, however, does not
explain the seemingly contradictory positions taken by Justices Black, Douglas and Stewart
in Chapman and Harrington. Nor does it account for the apparent inconsistency in Justice
White's position in all three major harmless constitutional error decisions.
2 Cf. People v. Pinzon, 44 N.Y.2d 458, 464, 377 N.E.2d 721, 724, 406 N.Y.S.2d 268, 271
(1978) (refusal to apply mechanical and arbitrary standards to determine time at which right
to counsel attaches).
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The New York Experience Under the Harmless Constitutional Error
Doctrine
Efforts by New York courts to implement the federal harmless
constitutional error rule illustratb the varying interpretations to
which the Supreme Court's decisions are subject. Although New
York appellate courts have applied the harmless error rule to a
variety of constitutional violations,5 prior to the 1975 decision of the
New York Court of Appeals in People v. Crimmins,54 the standard
used to measure harmlessness was unclear.5 In what remains per-
haps the most significant statement of when trial error necessitates
reversal in New York, the Crimmins court recognized that harmless-
ness must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 Judge Jones,
writing for the majority, stated that the threshold inquiry in any
harmless error case is whether there is overwhelming evidence of the
defendant's guilt.5 In making this determination, however, the
court did not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evi-
dence. Since, with the exception of a single-sentence confession by
the defendant, the "overwhelming" evidence was completely cir-
cumstantial, 8 it is suggested that the Crimmins majority may have
11 Violations of the rights established in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), were
assessed in People v. Rivers, 64 App. Div. 2d 834, 407 N.Y.S.2d 937 (4th Dep't 1978). A
harmless error test was applied to a violation of the defendant's Bruton rights, see note 30
supra, in People v. Baker, 26 N.Y.2d 169, 174, 257 N.E.2d 630, 633, 309 N.Y.S.2d 174, 178-79
(1970). In People v. Brown, 60 App. Div. 2d 890, 401 N.Y.S.2d 290 (2d Dep't 1978), the court
applied the harmless error rule to the admission of evidence in violation of the rule set forth
in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The harmfulness of a prosecutor's comments,
which raised improper inference regarding the defendant's failure to take the stand, was
assessed in People v. Abdul-Malik, 61 App. Div. 2d 657, 663, 403 N.Y.S.2d 253, 256-57 (1st
Dep't 1978); see People v. Williams, 63 App. Div. 2d 613, 411 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't 1979).
See generally Newman, Harmless Error in Criminal Appeals, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 16, 1978, at 1,
col. 1.
- 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975).
See, e.g., People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 262, 298 N.E.2d 78, 82, 344 N.Y.S.2d 900,
906 (1973); People v. Stanard, 32 N.Y.2d 143, 148, 297 N.E.2d 77, 80, 344 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334
(1973); People v. Steiner, 30 N.Y.2d 762, 763-64, 284 N.E.2d 577, 578, 333 N.Y.S.2d 423, 424
(1972); People v. McKinney, 24 N.Y.2d 180, 185, 247 N.E.2d 244, 246, 299 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405-
06 (1969).
, 36 N.Y.2d at 239, 326 N.E.2d at 792, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
'7 Id. at 240, 326 N.E.2d at 793, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 221. The Crimmins court stated that
overwhelmingness is shown where the untainted evidence is so "compelling" and "forceful"
that reasonable jurors "would almost certainly have convicted the defendant." Id. at 242, 326
N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
m Id. at 242-43, 326 N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222-23. The defendant in Crim-
mins remarked to her paramour: "'[Florgive me, I killed her.'" Id., 326 N.E.2d at 794, 367
N.Y.S.2d at 223. Under New York law, a confession is treated as direct evidence of guilt;
an admission, on the other hand, is circumstantial evidence. People v. Bretagna, 298 N.Y.
323, 83 N.E. 537, cert. denied, 336 U.S. 919 (1949); W. RICHARDSON, EVMENCE §§ 145, 150
(10th ed. J. Prince 1973); see People v. Eisenman, 39 N.Y.2d 810, 811, 351 N.E.2d 429, 430,
385 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (1976).
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overlooked an important qualification on the use of the
"overwhelming evidence" test implicitly recognized in Chapman.59
While excessive emphasis appears to have been placed on the find-
ing that the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the court explicitly
stated that the critical inquiry under Chapman is whether a
"reasonable possibility" exists that the error "contributed to the
conviction." 0
The next case decided by the court of appeals was People v.
Almestica,"' which involved the erroneous use of evidence seized in
an illegal search. 2 In finding that there was no reasonable possibil-
ity that this evidence contributed to the conviction, the court relied
heavily on the uncontradicted testimony of the victim, which, it
stressed, was entirely independent of and not derived from the
tainted evidence. 3 Finding that the other evidence introduced at
trial was "compelling and convincing," 4 the court viewed the
tainted evidence as "additional conclusive evidence" which was of
"negligible significance." 5
' See notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra.
'0 36 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 326 N.E.2d at 795, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 221. While the Crimmins court
indicated that the causal relationship between the error and the verdict is the critical factor,
its own inquiry appears to have ended once overwhelming evidence of guilt was found. See
id. at 237, 326 N.E.2d at 791, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 218.
When discussing nonconstitutional error, the Crimmins court declared that "an error is
prejudicial in this context if the appellate court concludes that there is a significant probabil-
ity, rather than only a rational possibility, in the particular case that the jury would have
acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error or errors which occurred." Id. at 242,
326 N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (emphasis added). By juxtaposing the terms
"significant probability" and "rational possibility," the court may have been indicating that
the question whether "the jury would have acquitted" is an appropriate inquiry in the assess-
ment of constitutional error. If this is the method for determining whether constitutional error
"contributed to the conviction," then the difference between the two tests is reduced to the
degree of certainty required of an appellate court before it can deem any error harmless. This
analysis of Crimmins is supported by the court's subsequent decision in People v. Almestica,
42 N.Y.2d 222, 366 N.E.2d 799, 397 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977); see notes 66-68 and accompanying
text infra. Accordingly, the Crimmins court formulation may not require a determination of
whether an error had an actual impact upon the jury's decision.
61 42 N.Y.2d 222, 366 N.E.2d 799, 397 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977).
12 Id. at 224-26, 366 N.E.2d at 801, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 710-11. The defendants inAlmestica
were charged with robbery and burglary. At trial, the prosecution introduced the stolen goods
and the weapons used in the robbery, all of which were seized when an auto the defendants
were driving was illegally stopped in violation of People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d
39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975), and People v. Simone, 39 N.Y.2d 818, 351 N.E.2d 432, 385
N.Y.S.2d 765 (1976), both decided after the Almestica trial.
42 N.Y.2d at 226-27, 366 N.E.2d at 802, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 712. According to the
Almestica court, it was critical that the testimony of the victim did not derive from the illegal
search and seizure. Id. But see notes 69-71 and accompanying text infra.
42 N.Y.2d at 224, 366 N.E.2d at 800-01, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
Id. at 224, 226, 366 N.E.2d at 800, 802, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 710, 712.
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The Almestica decision appears to be a departure from the
reasonable possibility test suggested in Chapman and echoed in
Crimmins. Since the evidence submitted to the trial judge consisted
primarily of the victim's testimony and the illegally seized evidence,
it is difficult to accept the conclusion that the inadmissible evidence
had no effect upon the decision of the trial judge, especially when
he made "extensive use of the improperly admitted testimony" in
his oral decision." The more likely explanation for the Almestica
ruling is that the court focused primarily on whether the trier of fact
would have found the defendant guilty in the absence of the tainted
evidence." Viewed in this light, Almestica seems to represent an
application of the overwhelming evidence test, a test which approxi-
mates the New York nonconstitutional error standard. 8
The Almestica court may also be questioned for its reliance on
the fact that the victim's testimony was independent of the illegally
obtained evidence." If the victim's testimony was the fruit of the
illegal seizure, it probably would have been inadmissible, leaving
" Id. at 226, 366 N.E.2d at 802, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 712. Moore v. United States, 429 U.S.
20 (1976) (per curiam), also involved review of error at a nonjury trial. In response to the
government's contention that the error was harmless, the Court stated that "whatever the
merits of that argument as a general proposition it has a hollow ring in a case where the trial
judge expressly relied upon the inadmissible evidence in finding the defendant guilty." Id.
at 22; see R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 24.
See 42 N.Y.2d at 229, 366 N.E.2d at 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 714 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
For a criticism of the "correct result" test apparently used in Almestica, see R. TRAYNOR,
supra note 4, at 18-22.
11 See 42 N.Y.2d at 229, 366 N.E.2d at 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 714, (Cooke, J., dissenting);
notes 82-87 infra. Reflecting the concerns expressed by the dissenters in Harrington and
Milton, see notes 33, 42 supra, the Almestica dissent argued that the majority based its
decision on "its own conclusion as to what verdict would have been reached by a jury or...
Trial Justice" had only the untainted evidence been presented. 42 N.Y.2d at 229, 366 N.E.2d
at 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 714 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
" 42 N.Y.2d at 226-27, 366 N.E.2d at 802, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 712. In support of its analysis,
the Almestica majority cited Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), noting that the case
was distinguishable on the ground that the Fahy defendant confessed only after he was
confronted with incriminating evidence obtained through an illegal search. Among its other
findings, the Fahy Court concluded that the defendant should have been given the opportun-
ity to show that his confession was tainted because it was induced when the police confronted
him with the illegally seized goods. Id. at 90-91. In Almestica, however, it was clear that the
crucial testimony was in no way related to the illegally seized evidence. Thus, it is difficult
to understand why the court believed that it was necessary to distinguish Fahy.
70 See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963). Under the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine, evidence which "has been come at by exploitation of [illegal
police action]" must be suppressed. Id. at 488. Only in a few rare instances could evidence
derived indirectly from illegal police conduct be admitted at trial. E.g., People v. Payton, 45
N.Y.2d 300, 313-14, 380 N.E.2d 224, 231, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395, 402, prob. juris. noted, 99 S. Ct.
718 (1978); People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 506-07, 300 N.E.2d 139, 141-42, 346 N.Y.S.2d
793, 797, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973); People v. Mendez, 28 N.Y.2d 94, 100-01, 268
N.E.2d 778, 781-82, 320 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44-45, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 911 (1971).
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no untainted evidence for the trial judge's consideration. It does not
follow, however, that because the improperly admitted evidence was
unrelated to the victim's testimony it was harmless. One piece of
evidence, although independent of any other, may nevertheless have
an extremely prejudicial effect." Thus, whether the untainted evi-
dence is independent of the tainted evidence does not seem relevant
to whether the tainted evidence is harmless.
The inconsistent approach taken by the New York Court of
Appeals72 is reflected in subsequent cases decided by lower appellate
courts. In one line of cases, the courts' inquiry focused not on
whether the error actually influenced the verdict, but rather, on
whether the defendants would have been convicted had the error not
occurred.3 This standard differs significantly from the Crimmins
1' The Almestica dissent noted that if the trier of fact had any doubts about the defen-
dant's guilt from the untainted testimony alone, they were removed when the tainted evi-
dence was presented. 42 N.Y.2d at 228, 366 N.E.2d at 803, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 713 (Cooke, J.,
dissenting).
72 The court of appeals appeared to return to the reasonable possibility standard in
People v. Evans, 43 N.Y.2d 160, 371 N.E.2d 528, 400 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1977). The defendant in
Evans was accused of selling narcotics to an undercover agent. After the agent bought the
drugs, he immediately contacted his superior, who stopped the defendant a short time later
and conducted a search. Although the defendant possessed no drugs, the officer testified that
he found in the defendant's pocket three ten dollar bills which allegedly were used by the
undercover agent to pay for the narcotics. The Evans court concluded that the search of the
defendant was improper. Although there was probable cause to arrest the defendant at the
time of the search, he was not arrested until a month later, because the police sought to
protect the identity of the undercover agent. The court held that the search could not be
sustained unless there was a contemporaneous arrest. Id. at 163-66, 371 N.E.2d at 530-31,400
N.Y.S.2d at 811-13. Since the police officer's testimony corroborated important aspects of the
prosecutor's case and was used by the prosecutor in his summation, the court concluded that
the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 167, 371 N.E.2d at 532, 400
N.Y.S.2d at 814.
In another recent case, People v. Von Werne, 41 N.Y.2d 584, 362 N.E.2d 982, 394
N.Y.S.2d 183 (1977), a police officer testified that the defendant had refused to answer some
questions before he was arrested. The admission of this testimony represented a violation of
the defendant's right to remain silent. Id. at 587-88, 362 N.E.2d at 985, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 186.
The effect of the error was magnified when the trial court instructed the jury that it could
not infer guilt from the defendant's refusal to testify at trial, but failed to instruct it that the
same rule applied to the defendant's pre-arrest silence. Id., 362 N.E.2d at 985, 394 N.Y.S.2d
at 187. Examining the record, the court found that there was less than overwhelming evidence
of an essential element of the crime charged. Id. at 588, 362 N.E.2d at 985, 394 N.Y.S.2d at
187. Thus, it concluded, the error could not be harmless under the overwhelming evidence
test. Additionally, since there was at least a reasonable possibility that the inadmissable
statements of the police officer actually contributed to the conviction, the case also failed to
meet the requirements of the reasonable possibility test.
1 In People v. Napolitano, 62 App. Div. 2d 955, 404 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st Dep't 1978), the
defendant made admissions following his indictment. These statements were erroneously
admitted at trial, but "because of the overwhelming weight of the People's evidence, ...
the admission. . . was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 955-56, 404 N.Y.S.2d at
21. In People v. Goldston, 59 App. Div. 2d 704, 398 N.Y.S.2d 289 (2d Dep't 1977), the court
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test in which a finding of overwhelming evidence is merely the
threshold determination in the assessment of harmlessness.74 In a
second line of cases, New York courts have applied the reasonable
possibility test.7 5 While the same result may be reached in a particu-
lar case regardless of which test is applied, the tests are not identical
and harmlessness may be found under one test but not under the
other in a number of instances.76
NONCONsTTuTIoNAL ERROR
The seminal decision for review of nonconstitutional errors in
held that a showup identification was not reversible error, see Manson v. Braithwaite, 432
U.S. 98 (1977), but noted that even if the error were reversible, the conviction should never-
theless be afftuied due to the overwhelming amount of evidence indicating guilt. 59 App.
Div. 2d at 704, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 290. Finally, in People v. Caplandies, 57 App. Div. 2d 971,
394 N.Y.S.2d 96 (3d Dep't 1977), a suppressed inculpatory statement obtained in violation
of Miranda was used to help the victim refresh her recollection of the location of the crime.
Without deciding whether the victim's testimony regarding the scene of the crime was "fruit
of the poisonous tree," see note 70 supra, the court found that any error was harmless since
it considered the evidence against the defendant "devastating" and the location of the crime
an "incidental matter." 57 App. Div. 2d at 971, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 97.
7, People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240-41, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793, 367 N.Y.S. 213, 221
(1975); see note 57 and accompanying text supra.
75 In People v. Schlictcroll, 59 App. Div. 2d 545, 396 N.Y.S.2d 898 (2d Dep't 1977), the
court apparently applied the reasonable possibility test to a Bruton violation, see note 30
supra, although no express reference was made to the test. In People v. Harding, 59 App. Div.
2d 897, 399 N.Y.S.2d 57 (2d Dep't 1977), a statement of the defendant was erroneously
admitted into evidence and testimony was given regarding the defendant's silence. The court
determined that the errors "may have contributed to the conviction" and reversed. Id. at 897,
399 N.Y.S.2d at 58. In People v. Jones, 61 App. Div. 2d 264, 402 N.Y.S.2d 28 (2d Dep't 1978),
the defendant signed a written confession without being advised of his Miranda rights. The
court held that "[w]ith the possible exception of a confession from the stand, nothing could
have damned the appellant more. . . ." Id. at 267-68, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 30. Thus, there was
at least "a reasonable doubt that the error . . . contribute[d] to [the] conviction." Id. In
contrast, one of the dissenters argued that the overwhelming evidence alone rendered the
error harmless. Id. at 268-69, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 31 (Suozzi, J., dissenting) (citing People v.
Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 366 N.E.2d 799, 397 N.Y.S.2d 709 (1977)).
76 dompare People v. Bowen, 65 App. Div. 2d 364, 369, 411 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (1st Dep't
1978), with id. at 375, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 581 (Sandler, J., dissenting). While an error may be
found prejudicial under the overwhelming evidence test but harmless under the reasonable
possibility test, it is more likely that the converse would be true. For example, if a matchbook
which placed the defendant's vehicle at the scene of the crime was illegally seized, a finding
of harmlessness would depend on whether untainted overwhelming evidence of guilt existed.
Under the reasonable possibilty test, however, the amount of untainted evidence only is
relevant to show the impact of error upon the jury. Thus, regardless of the quantity of other
evidence, the illegal seizure of a matchbook would be harmless only if it played an insignifi-
cant part in the prosecution's case. This example is based on People v. DeGina, 39 N.Y.2d
96, 99, 346 N.E.2d 809, 810, 382 N.Y.S.2d 971, 972 (1976), wherein the court found the
admission of the matchbook harmless "in view of all of the other evidence placing the vehicle
at the scene of the crimes." Id.
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federal criminal trials is Kotteakos v. United States." The
Kotteakos Court held that unless "the judgment was not substan-
tially swayed" or "influenced" by the error, "it is impossible to
conclude that substantial rights were not affected.17 8 Under this
test, which resembles the "reasonable possibility" standard, an
appellate court must be convinced that the error was not a signifi-
cant factor in producing the verdict. 9 Thus, although the inquiries
are similar, the federal test for harmless nonconstitutional error is
somewhat less demanding than the standard for harmless constitu-
tional error.80
Courts at the state level are free to adopt their own standards
for reviewing nonconstitutional error.8' In New York, the leading
case on the question of harmless nonconstitutional error is People
v. Crimmins.12 In clarifying New York's rule governing nonconstitu-
tional error, the Crimmins court observed that there is a two-step
process for determining whether the error is prejudicial .8  The
threshold question is whether, excluding the errors, the "quantum
and nature" of the evidence against the defendant is overwhelm-
ing." If overwhelming evidence does not exist, the inquiry ends and
the error can never be deemed harmless.s If the evidence of guilt is
" 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Kotteakos, decided in 1946, was based on an interpretation of §
269 of the Judicial Code. Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269, 40 Stat. 1181; see 328 U.S. at
757. This section was repealed, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992, and replaced
by the Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 110, 63 Stat. 105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976)).
Kotteakos, however, remains the leading decision in this area. See, e.g., United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976); United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 161 n.19 (2d Cir. 1974)
(Friendly, J.); United States v. Birnbaum, 373 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837
(1967); 3 C. WIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 853-54 (1969).
7' 328 U.S. at 765.
n Id. The Court stated: "If... [an appellate court] is sure that the error did not
influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and judgment should stand
. ." Id. at 764. Thus, the Kotteakos Court apparently rejected the overwhelming evidence
test when it stated that "[tihe inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to
support the result apart from the phase affected by the error." Id. at 765.
81 See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
accord, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-
87 (1963).
a' See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). A variety of harmless error tests have
been developed in the state courts. See, e.g., People v. Perry, 7 Cal. 3d 756, 499 P.2d 129,
103 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1972); State v. Trudo, 253 N.W.2d 101, (Iowa) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 903
(1977); Commonwealth v. Bottiglio, 357 Mass. 593, 259 N.E.2d 570 (1970); State v. White,
295 Minn. 217, 203 N.W.2d 852 (1973); Forrest v. State, 335 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1976); Woodhull
v. State, 43 Wis. 202, 168 N.W.2d 281 (1969).
82 36 N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975).
Id. at 240-41, 326 N.E.2d at 793, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U.S. 85, 86 (1963); citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)).
36 N.Y.2d at 242, 326 N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222; see note 57 supra.
36 N.Y.2d at 240, 326 N.E.2d at 793,367 N.Y.S.2d at 221. The Crimmins court rejected
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overwhelming, the appellate court still cannot find harmlessness if
it "concludes that there is a significant probability .. .that the
jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the
error or errors which occurred.""6 Although New York requires a
threshold finding of overwhelming evidence in both constitutional
and nonconstitutional error cases, the difference in approach is
evident in the second prong of the test. While "reasonable possi-
bility" of impact on the jury is the key in determining the effect of
constitutional error, the nonconstitutional error standard focuses
on whether acquittal would have resulted had the error not
occurred."7
A UNIFORM STANDARD IN CRIMINAL CASES
The Case for a Uniform Standard
While the tests for measuring the harmlessness of nonconstitu-
tional error in both federal and New York State courts are less
stringent than are the standards used in evaluating constitutional
error,m the basis for this distinction has not been satisfactorily ex-
the notion that overwhelming evidence alone can render a constitutional or nonconstitutional
error harmless. Id. at 241-42, 326 N.E.2d at 793, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222.
"Id. at 242, 326 N.E.2d at 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 222 (emphasis added). Judge, now Chief
Judge, Cook criticized the majority for establishing a "trifurcated standard" for reviewing
questions of harmless error. Id. at 244, 326 N.E.2d at 795, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 224 (Cooke, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Noting that there is now the "significant prob-
ability" test for nonconstitutional error, the "reasonable possibility" test for constitutional
error and a test for error "of constitutional proportion, namely, the right to a fair trial,"
without regard to whether the error was prejudicial, id. at 243-45, 326 N.E.2d at 795, 367
N.Y.S.2d at 223-24 (Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Judge Cooke
expressed concern thai confusion would result when appellate courts attempt to employ the
various standards. Accordingly, he contended that a single standard for assessing error should
be adopted. Id. at 246-47, 326 N.E.2d at 797, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 226 (Cooke, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
87 See text accompanying notes 47-60 supra.
8 Even when nonconstitutional error has a substantial impact upon the jury's verdict,
reversal is not required. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974); United
States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911 (9th Cir. 1977). The federal nonconstitutional error test
permits affirmance "if the evidence is so 'strong' that no sensible jury, had there been no
error, would conceivably have acquitted .. "United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155
F.2d 631, 647 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Likewise, under the
New York rule, nonconstitutional error is harmless unless "there is a significant probability
. ..that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had it not been for the error or errors
which occurred." People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 242, 326 N.E.2d 787, 794, 367 N.Y.S.2d
213, 222 (1975). The burden of proving the harmlessness of error is on the party which
benefitted, whether the error was constitutional, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967); accord, United States v. Lookretis, 398 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), vacated, 390 U.S. 338
(1968), or nonconstitutional, Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946); accord,
United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
Prejudice arising from merely technical errors, however, is to be proved by the complaining
party. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946).
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plained. Although, as a general rule, constitutional violations may
be more egregious than other types of errors, the circumstances of a
particular case may render the nonconstitutional error far more pre-
judicial.8 9 For example, improper jury instructions or irrelevant in-
flammatory evidence can be at least as prejudicial as constitutional
errors." Since "the effect of the evidence in the context of [a]
particular case"'" bears little relation to whether the error is consti-
tutional or nonconstitutional, there seems to be little justification
for a rule which makes the determination of harmlessness hinge on
the label attached to the error.
As a practical matter, the application of a uniform standard in
criminal cases would lead to clarity and consistency in appellate
review of error. With one test for constitutional error, another for
nonconstitutional error and, in some instances, a third to determine
whether the defendant received a fair trial,92 it is not surprising that
the appellate courts' attempts to apply the various standards have
resulted in confusion. 3 Resolving the subtle problems inherent in
any harmless error test seems a difficult enough task for appellate
courts without the additional burden of a trifurcated standard.
The Reasonable Possibility Standard
Although it is clear that constitutional error is nonprejudicial
only if harmlessness is proved "beyond a reasonable doubt,"'" the
11 See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 247, 326 N.E.2d 787, 797, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213,
226 (1975) (Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4,
at 48-49; Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 1025. See also Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 513-
14 (2d Cir. 1961).
11 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 413-15 (1957); Moody v. United States,
376 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1967); People v. Silverman, 252 App. Div. 149, 172, 297 N.Y.S.
449, 474 (2d Dep't 1937).
" Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 94 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see People v.
Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 245-46, 326 N.E.2d 787, 796-97, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 225-26 (1975)
(Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 989-99. Both
Judge Cooke and Professor Saltzburg have expressed the view that the "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard was adopted by the Supreme Court as a corollary to the guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials. See 36 N.Y.2d at 245-46, 326 N.E.2d
at 796-97, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 225-26 (Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 989-99.
9 See note 86 supra.
See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 244, 326 N.E.2d 787, 795, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213,
224 (1975) (Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4,
at 48-49. The Crimmins court noted that, before its decision, there was often "no explicit
recognition that there is a distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional error;
citations and verbiage have frequently been indiscriminately interchanged." 36 N.Y.2d at
239, 326 N.E.2d at 792, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 219.
21 See note 4 supra.
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methods for determining whether this standard of proof is met re-
main uncertain. If a single test is to be adopted to assess both
constitutional and nonconstitutional error, it would seem useful to
evaluate the relative merits of the various approaches. One possibil-
ity is the overwhelming evidence test, under which an appellate
court inquires whether, absent the erroneously admitted evidence,
there was an overwhelming evidence of guilt. If the court finds that
the jury almost certainly would have convicted the defendant with-
out the untainted evidence, the beyond a reasonable doubt require-
ment is satisfied. 5 In effect, the focus of the court is on whether the
jury reached a correct result." When the court applies the over-
whelming evidence test, the harmful effect of reading a "cold re-
cord" is magnified. An appellate court is unable to assess the weight
that the jury may have assigned to a particular piece of evidence; 7
even with apparent overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error may
have been a substantial factor in the jury's decision. 8 In addition
to the possibility that a defendant may have been convicted based
on erroneously admitted evidence, the greater harm in using this
test is usurpation of the jury's function." When an appellate court
assumes the jury's function by substituting its judgment, it is, in
essence, retrying the case. As a result, a criminal defendant may be
3 See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
People v. Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 228-29, 366 N.E.2d 799, 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713-14
(1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting); People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 249, 326 N.E.2d 787, 798,
367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 228-29 (1975) (Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Field,
supra note 26, at 16-19.
,1 See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 18-22. See generally People v. Nuzzo, 294 N.Y. 227,
235-36, 62 N.E.2d 47, 51 (1945).
," See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 650 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., dissenting); United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915,920-22 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945). In Judge Frank's opinion, "[i]t is seldom possible
with even moderate competence to conjecture solely from perusal of a written or printed
record whether or not a defendant is guilty." Id. at 920 (Frank, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). The danger of an appellate court erroneously affirming a conviction due to its
inability to accurately perceive the truthfulness of the evidence has been noted by Justice
Traynor:
Many factors may affect the probative value of testimony, such as age, sex, intelli-
gence, experience, occupation, demeanor, or temperament of the witness. A trial
court or jury before whom witnesses appear is at least in a position to take note of
such factors. An appellate court has no way of doing so.
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 20 (footnotes omitted).
9 See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting); People
v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 249, 326 N.E.2d 787, 798, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 228-29 (1975)
(Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); R. Traynor, supra note 4, at 21-22;
Field, supra note 26, at 17-19, 34-35.
" See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 648 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank,
J., dissenting).
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deprived of his constitutional right to a trial by jury.'0 Thus, while
the overwhelming evidence test may provide assurance to an appel-
late court that the defendant is guilty in fact, it does not assure that
the defendant is guilty in law."'1 Such a determination may only be
made by a jury.02 Not only is there a significant risk that a defen-
dant will be erroneously convicted under this test, but public con-
fidence in the belief that every individual is entitled to a fair trial
will be diminished. 0 3
Another unsatisfactory element of the overwhelming evidence
test is its failure to deter prosecutorial misconduct. Knowing that
an appellate court may find the untainted evidence overwhelming,
a prosecutor may be less reluctant to insert error into the record as
"0 See, e.g., id. at 650 (Frank, J., dissenting); United States v. Rubenstein, 151 F.2d 915,
922-23 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 766 (1945); People v. Crimmins,
36 N.Y.2d 230, 249, 326 N.E.2d 787, 798-99, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 228-29 (1975) (Cooke, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); R. TRAYNoR, supra note 4, at 18-22; Field, supra
note 26, at 32-36. Justice Traynor maintains that the mere fact that the trial court reached
the correct result on the question of guilt or innocence, does not necessarily render the result
a just one. According to Justice Traynor, inquiring whether the correct result was reached or
would have been reached without the error, deprives the defendant of his right to confront
witnesses against him and his right to trial by jury in a criminal case. R. TRAYNoR, supra note
4, at 21. Similarly, if the inquiry is whether overwhelming evidence supports the verdict, the
conviction still might be based upon the error. Id. at 22. Justice Traynor argues that the
critical inquiry should be whether error may have affected the judgment, id. at 13, and favors
a standard which requires a high probability that the error not influence the verdict. Id. at
35. "A less stringent test may fail to deter an appellate judge from focusing his inquiry on
the correctness of the result and then holding the error harmless whenever he equated the
result with his own predilections." Id. See also note 101 infra.
1*1 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763-64 (1946). The Kotteakos Court
noted that
[iut is not the appellate court's function to determine guilt or innocence. Nor is it
to speculate upon probable reconviction and decide according to how the specula-
tion comes out. Appellate judges cannot escape such impressions. But they may not
make them sole criteria for reversal or affirmance. Those judgments are exclusively
for the jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence legally sufficient to
sustain the conviction unaffected by the error. . . . This is different, or may be,
from guilt in fact. It is guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen. And
the question is, not were they right in their judgment, regardless of the error or its
effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be
taken to have had upon the jury's decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the
thing done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total setting.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
02 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; see note 101 supra.
103 See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 662-64 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 22, 80-81; Mause, supra note 4, at 554-
56. An additional difficulty inherent in the overwhelming evidence test is its failure to account
for the effect of the order in which the evidence was presented at trial, although the temporal
sequence of admission of illegally obtained evidence may significantly affect the defense's
trial tactics. See generally Field, supra note 26, at 44-45, 54-55; Saltzburg, supra note 9, at
990.
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an added assurance that the jury will find the defendant guilty.l0
Assuming that the prosecutor makes a rational decision regarding
his actions, only a more stringent standard of harmless error would
minimize this possibility by increasing the risk of reversal. 05
A second possible test for determining whether error is harmless
is the cumulative evidence test. Under this test, harmlessness is
established when the erroneously admitted evidence is merely du-
plicative or cumulative of untainted evidence, since the error adds
nothing material to the case.' Different results may be attained,
'" See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 656-58 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting); People v. Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 228-29, 366 N.E.2d 799, 804, 397
N.Y.S.2d 709, 713-14 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting); People v. Catalanotte, 36 N.Y.2d 192,
198, 325 N.E.2d 866, 869, 366 N.Y.S.2d 403, 407-08 (1975) (Cooke, J., dissenting). See also
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-89 (1935); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 58; Kamisar,
Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MIcH.
L. Rav. 219, 236-44 (1962); Mause, supra note 4, at 522-54; Reappraisal, supra note 4, at 817-
18. In his dissenting opinion in People v. Catalanotte, 36 N.Y.2d 192, 325 N.E.2d 866, 366
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1975), Judge Cooke observed:
Excessive reliance on the existence of other proof of guilt, in the face of clearly
prejudicial error, could lead to harm for it would seem to encourage an overly
zealous prosecutor with a strong case to gratuitously prejudice defendant's rights
by unfair tactics in an attempt to insure conviction. It is important to the proper
administration of justice that appellate sanctions remain an ever-present deter-
rent.. . . Applying the "harmless error" doctrine with too broad a sweep would
remove one of the chief deterrents to overreaching by a prosecutor.
Id. at 198, 325 N.E.2d at 869, 366 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (Cooke, J., dissenting); see People v.
Almestica, 42 N.Y.2d 222, 228-29, 366 N.E.2d 799, 804, 397 N.Y.S.2d 709, 713-14 (1977)
(Cooke, J., dissenting). See generally United States ex rel. Macon v. Yeager, 476 F.2d 613,
616-17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973). A harmless error rule which takes into
account deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct would not, of course, discourage intentional
errors in circumstances such as Harrington and Chapman where a decision handed down after
the trial renders the use of particular evidence improper.
"I An automatic reversal standard has been suggested for cases in which the prosecutor
knowingly violates a defendant's constitutional rights. See Manse, supra note 4, at 553. For
example, where perjured testimony is knowingly used, or evidence favorable to the defense
is intentionally suppressed, automatic reversal would be warranted. Mause, supra note 4, at
553.
In cases where the defense learns after trial that the prosecution knowingly used false
testimony or failed to disclose evidence favorable to the defense, the Supreme Court has
developed a standard which differs from, but is analogous to, a harmless error rule. When
the prosecutor's case included perjured testimony, and the prosecutor knew or should have
known that the testimony was untrue, the conviction must be reversed "if there [was] any
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury."
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (footnote omitted); see Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). The perjured
testimony is deemed to have affected the jury's judgment if it is "material." 427 U.S. at 104.
"I For examples of cases where cumulative evidence has been a crucial factor, see Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230-32 (1973); Osborne v. United States, 542 F.2d 1015, 1018
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 905 (1977); United States v. Burrell, 505 F.2d 904, 909 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Harrington
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however, according to how "cumulativeness" is defined. Under the
broadest definition, the untainted evidence need only establish the
same ultimate fact as the tainted evidence - the defendant's
guilt.107 This test, however, can be narrowly circumscribed by re-
quiring that the untainted evidence be of the same type as the
tainted evidence and that each have the same damaging effect, as,
for example, when an inadmissible confession is corroborated by a
properly admitted confession."' As an added safeguard, it has been
suggested that the courts require the untainted evidence to be un-
controverted." 9
The cumulative evidence test, rejected by the Supreme Court
in Harrington, is subject to many of the same criticisms as the
overwhelming evidence test. Since the tainted evidence, although
cumulative, may very well have contributed to the jury's verdict, an
appellate court, in effect, may still be deciding the guilt of the
defendant."0 Moreover, since the appellate court's inquiry is com-
plete upon a finding of cumulativeness, the test does not adequately
consider the possibility that the jury may not have been persuaded
of the defendant's guilt had it not been presented with the tainted
evidence."' Finally, where a narrow definition of cumulativeness is
used, this test would find clearly harmless error to be prejudicial,
merely because it is not corroborative.12
v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253-54 (1969) (error supplied same evidence as other evidence in
case). For an interesting and extensive discussion of the cumulative evidence test, see Field,
supra note 26, at 37-58.
'1 Field, supra note 26, at 41. As an example of a broadly defined cumulative evidence
test, Professor Field cites Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Field, supra note 26,
at 41. In Brown, the codefendants' incriminating statements were introduced at trial in
violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 411 U.S. at 230. Among other
evidence, the police observed and photographed the defendants during the robbery. Id. at 226.
The Court held the inadmissible Bruton statements were "merely cumulative" of other evi-
dence in the case and therefore harmless. Id. at 231.
10 See Field, supra note 26, at 41-43, 48. Under a broadly defined test, different types of
evidence proving the same ultimate factor may be deemed cumulative although each may
have a significantly different impact. See, e.g., People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal. 2d 319, 405 P.2d
555, 46 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1965); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 69-71; Field, supra note 40, 41-42.
For example, a tape recording of the defendant, played at the sentencing part of the trial in
Jacobson, indicated that the defendant had no remorse after killing his child. This evidence
may have been significantly more influential than witnesses providing the same evidence
through testimony. 63 Cal. 2d at 330, 405 P.2d at 563-64, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 523-24. See also
People v. Kitchen, 55 App. Div. 2d 575, 399 JP.Y.S.2d 83 (1st Dep't 1976).
'o' See Field, supra note 26, at 44-54.
"' See id. at 52.
' Id.
112 If a narrow definition of cumulativeness was used, the errors in Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), Grieco v. Meachum, 533 F.2d 713, 716-17 (lst'Cir.), cert. denied,
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A third test for measuring harmlessness would require the court
to assess the constitutional violation in isolation. Under this test, an
appellate court disregards the untainted evidence and inquires
whether the error is prejudicial.113 If the error is of a type that is
likely to have influenced the jury, reversal is warranted. While this
standard eliminates the problems inherent in the overwhelming evi-
dence and cumulative evidence tests, it is objectionable because it
requires the court to assess the effect of the error without regard to
the facts and circumstances of a particular case."' The per se rules
which would result from the application of this test are undesirable,
because the identical error committed in the context of two cases
may have a significant impact upon the jury in one case and a trivial
effect in another. 1 5
The preferable standard for assessing harmlessness is the rea-
sonable possibility test,"' which requires reversal if there is a rea-
sonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction."'
The primary advantage offered by this test is that it permits the
court to analyze the impact of the tainted evidence in the context
of the other evidence in the record. Although overwhelming evi-
dence should not be the basis of finding harmlessness, the quantum
and nature of the untainted evidence is relevant to whether the error
was a substantial factor at trial."' Thus, as the quantum and proba-
429 U.S. 858 (1976), and People v. DeGina, 39 N.Y.2d 96, 346 N.E.2d 809, 382 N.Y.S.2d 971
(1976), would be considered prejudicial.
" Field, supra note 26, at 16-19, 23-32; see notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
' See R. TRAYNoR, supra note 4, at 36; Field, supra note 26, at 17.
" The facts in United States v. Gramlich, 551 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 866 (1978), provide an illustration of the problems inherent in the application of this
test. The defendant was convicted of importation of marijuana. He was arrested while unload-
ing marijuana from a Colombian freighter to a beachhead. 551 F.2d at 1363-64. An illegally
seized passport and airplane ticket to Colombia were admitted into evidence at trial and the
defendant was convicted. Had the conviction been based solely on circumstantial evidence,
the improper use of the passport and airplane ticket would have been highly prejudicial.
Given the nature and quantum of the other evidence in the case, however, there was no
reasonable possibility that the error had a prejudicial impact. On the other hand, if the
appellate court had been confined to focusing solely on the tainted evidence it is suggested
that it could not have adequately evaluated the possibility of prejudice. See also United
States v. Savell, 546 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1977).
"I The Chapman Court noted that the reasonable possibility standard is equivalent to
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 386 U.S. at 24; see note 25 supra.
S"' See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85,
86-87 (1963); notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v. Bosch, 584
F.2d 1113, 1123 (1st Cir. 1978).
" Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting); People
v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 221 (1975); R.
TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 22, 36. Overwhelming evidence, of course, may make the error
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tive value of untainted evidence increases, it is more likely that the
error did not contribute to the conviction. " 9 While it is not possible
to learn what evidence actually swayed the jury,12 it may be as-
sumed that an error contributed to the verdict if, upon a review of
the entire record, "it appears that [the error] was a substantial
part of the prosecution's case . .".1."2I With the exception of an
automatic reversal rule, this is perhaps the strictest standard for
harmless by rendering the impact of the error insignificant. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 22;
see Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 500 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1974). Similarly, the
quantum and nature of the erroneously admitted evidence is a relevant consideration since
certain types of evidence have greater prejudicial effect than others. For example, confessions
before or at trial are extremely prejudicial. See Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
Eyewitness testimony and photographs of the crime usually are exceedingly damaging.
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 226 (1973). Likewise, fruits of the crime
are highly incriminating. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 553 F.2d 1132 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 959 (1977). See generally text accompanyng accompanying notes 37-39
supra.
I" See, e.g., United States v. Matos, 444 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1971) (Pell, J.,
concurring). Unlike civil cases where statutes allow other than general verdicts, see, e.g., FED.
R. Civ. P. 49; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. § 4111 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-1979), special verdicts
and answers to interrogatories generally are prohibited in criminal cases. United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180-83 (1st Cir. 1969); G. CLuMNTSoN, SPECIAL Vmimnas AND SPECIAL
FINDINGS By JuRuEs 49 (1905); accord, United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958); Skidmore v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 167 F.2d 54, 70 (2d Cir.)
(Hand, J., concurring), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948); United States v. Ogull, 149 F.
Supp. 272, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Gernie, 252 F.2d 664
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 968 (1958). Special verdicts are used in only two situations
in criminal cases: sentencing proceedings, see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
and treason cases, where a special finding of an overt act is required by the constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; see, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
"I People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 84, 429 P.2d 606, 621, 60 Cal. Rptr. 254, 269 (1967)
(Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470 (1968) (per
curiam). Finding harmless error, the state appellate court in Ross interpreted the reasonable
possibility test articulated in Chapman to require that there be no "reasonable possibility
that [the] jury could have reached any verdict other than one of guilt absent the prosecutor's
comments." Id. at 77, 429 P.2d at 614, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 262. Chief Justice Traynor dissented,
however, arguing that Chapman was "susceptible of two interpretations." First, the major-
ity's interpretation focuses on whether the verdict would have been the same or whether there
was overwhelming evidence of guilt. Id. at 84-86, 429 P.2d at 620-21, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 268-69
(Traynor, C.J., dissenting). The other and more likely interpretation, in his view, was whether
"an error that constituted a substantial part of the prosecution's case may have played
a substantial part in the jury's deliberation and thus contributed to the actual verdict
reached. . . ." Id. at 86, 429 P.2d at 621, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 269 (Traynor, C.J., dissenting).
See also United States v. D'Andrea, 585 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1978). The Supreme
Court's subsequent reversal of the Ross conviction, see Ross v. California, 391 U.S. 470
(1968) (per curiam), seems to lend support to Chief Justice Traynor's assessment of the
Chapman standard. In Chapman, the Court stated that since the jurors may have acquitted
had the unconstitutional comments not been made, it was "completely impossible" that
the error did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the conviction. 386 U.S. at 26.
Accordingly, an error is not harmless merely because a jury may have convicted had the
error not occurred.
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appraising the harmlessness of error. 2
A separate argument in favor of the reasonable possibility stan-
dard is that it does not infringe on the defendant's sixth amendment
right to trial by jury. 23A defendant is afforded his full right to a jury
trial only when an appellate court can state that any errors commit-
ted at trial were not substantial factors in the conviction. 24 The
requirement that the court must find it not reasonably possible that
the error infected the verdict reduces the risk that the error contrib-
uted to the conviction, and ensures a defendant of his right to a trial
by jury.
The aim of any test for harmlessness must be to prevent a
conviction based in any way upon error. As stated by the New York
Court of Appeals:
The worst criminal, the most culpable individual, is as much enti-
tled to the benefit of a rule of law as the most blameless member
of society. To disregard violation of the rule because there is proof
in the record to persuade [the court] of a defendant's guilt would
but lead to erosion of the rule and endanger the rights of even those
who are innocent.'2
It is submitted that only a test which requires a finding that
the error had no effect upon the jury's determination, and which is
equally applicable in cases involving constitutional and nonconsti-
tutional error, adequately protects the rights of both the guilty and
the innocent.
The Constitutional Basis for Applying a Uniform Standard
In holding that errors of constitutional significance are gov-
erned by federal law, the Chapman Court relied not on the due
process clause or any other constitutional provision, but rather on
the Court's inherent authority to formulate rules for enforcing fed-
2 See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 240-41, 326 N.E.2d 787, 793, 367 Ni.Y.S.2d
213, 221 (1975); R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 35.
"21 The rule established in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968), requires the
states to provide a trial by jury for all crimes having a potential punishment of six months
or more, and for crimes where the potential punishment is less than six months if the crime
is not a petty offense. In some instances, a defendant may be tried by the court, provided he
has the right to a de novo trial by jury at the appellate level. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts,
427 U.S. 618 (1976). But cf. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (article three of the
Constitution requires jury trial at trial level).
124 Even if a defendant waived his right to trial by jury, the other reasons for using the
reasonable possibility test, see notes 116-122 and accompanying text supra, appear per-
suasive. See generally Saltzburg, supra note 9, at 1028 n.146.
"' People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 154, 193 N.E.2d 628, 631, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845
(1963); see Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1977).
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eral constitutional guarantees.2 8 Under the Chapman reasoning, the
power of the states to apply their own rules to nonconstitutional
errors remains intact, even in criminal appeals.2 7 Since it appears
unlikely that the state courts voluntarily will adopt the generally
more demanding standard applicable to constitutional errors,1 the
only practical method for ensuring a uniform harmless error stan-
dard in criminal cases would be for the Supreme Court to establish
such a rule as a matter of constitutional necessity. The Court has
never held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to
appeal, 2 1 probably because every state grants appellate review in
criminal cases. 3 Once a state establishes a legal structure, however,
12 386 U.S. at 21. The Chapman majority stated:
Whether a conviction for crime should stand when a State has failed to accord
federal constitutionally guaranteed rights is every bit as much of a federal question
as what particular federal constitutional provisions themselves mean, what they
guarantee, and whether they have been denied. With faithfulness to the constitu-
tional union of the States, we cannot leave to the States the formulation of authori-
tative laws, rules, and remedies designed to protect people from infractions by
the States of federally guaranteed rights.
Id.; see note 23 supra.
12 386 U.S. at 21; see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
"I See, e.g., Wright v. State, 501 P.2d 1360 (Alaska 1972); Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59,
230 S.E.2d 869 (1976); Forrest v. State, 335 So. 2d 900 (Miss. 1976); People v. Crimmins, 36
N.Y.2d 230, 326 N.E.2d 787, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1975). But see People v. Bracey, 51 111. 2d
514, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1972).
212 E.g., Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-21
(1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 678 (1894). The Court
consistently has maintained that the right to appeal is granted statutorily and, apparently,
is subject to statutory abrogation. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
"I See ABA STANDARDS, CRIMINAL APPEALS § 1.1, commentary at 17 (1970). Since the
Court has never been confronted with a statutory denial of appellate review, it has had no
compelling reason to declare that a constitutional right to appeal exists. Nevertheless, an
analogy may be made to the issue of the level of proof required to convict in criminal cases.
Prior to its decision in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), there was never a need for the
Supreme Court to adopt the position that a defendant may not be declared guilty unless the
government proves every element of a criminal offense "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at
361-62. When confronted with a state statute lowering the burden of proof, however, the Court
held that the traditional "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is an element of due process.
Id. at 364. While the Winship Court noted that "it has long been assumed that proof...
beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required," id. at 362, it based its holding
primarily upon the conclusion that "the reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the
American scheme of criminal procedure." Id. at 363. Significantly, the Court observed:
The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense im-
portance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty . . . and
because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accord-
ingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should
not condemn a man when there is a reasonable doubt about his guilt.
Id. at 363-64. Just as the reasonable doubt standard is "a prime instrument for reducing the
risk of conviction resting on factual error," id. at 363, the right to appellate review might be
viewed as essential in minimizing the risk of imprisonment resulting from errors of law.
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its procedures must conform to the constraints of the fourteenth
amendment. 131 Therefore, it is suggested that when appellate re-
view is provided, it must be conducted within the confines of due
process. 3 As a corollary to the reasonable doubt burden of proof
standard at trial, due process may require an appellate court to
declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that errors committed
at trial did not contribute to the conviction. 133 The reasonable doubt
standard is grounded in the belief that it reduces the risk of convict-
ing an innocent person. 34 Likewise, the uniform use of the reasona-
ble possibility test at the appellate level would reduce the risk that
The American Bar Association has taken the position that "[t]he possibility of appellate
review of trial court judgments should exist for every criminal conviction. It is undesirable
to have any class of case in which such trial court determinations are unreviewable." ABA
STANDARDS, CRIMINAL APPEALs § 1.1 (1970). Similarly, one commentator has observed: "The
possibilities of error, oversight, arbitrariness and even venality in any human institution are
such that subjecting decisions to review of some kind answers a felt need: it would simply go
against the grain, today, to make a matter as sensitive as a criminal conviction subject to
unchecked determination by a single institution." Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. Rxv. 441, 453 (1963); see Commonwealth
ex rel. Neal v. Myers, 424 Pa. 576, 579 n.3, 227 A.2d 845, 846 n.3 (1967).
"I' See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973). Ham involved a statute empow-
ering trial judges to conduct voir dire examinations of potential jurors. The Court held that
once this procedure was established, due process mandated that the defendant be permitted
to submit questions to the jurors regarding racial bias. Id.
I12 See id.; Saltzburg, supra note 9, at.1028-30. In Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915),
the Court noted:
[W]hile the 14th Amendment does not require that a State shall provide for an
appellate review in criminal cases . . . it is perfectly obvious that where such an
appeal is provided for, and the prisoner has had the benefit of it, the proceedings
in the appellate tribunal are to be regarded as a part of the process of law under
which he is held in custody by the State, and to be considered in determining any
question of alleged deprivation of his life or liberty contrary to the 14th Amend-
ment.
Id. at 327 (citations omitted).
13 See People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 245-46, 326 N.E.2d 787, 796, 367 N.Y.S.2d
213, 225-26 (1975) (Cooke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Saltzburg, supra
note 9, at 1021-27.
13 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan stated
that the fact-finding process is founded upon probabilities since the trier of fact cannot know
with certainty what occurred at the time the crime was committed. Id. at 370 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, although not quantifiable, indicates
to the factfinder the "degree of confidence he is expected to have in the correctness of his
factual conclusions." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring). A preponderance of the evidence is a
satisfactory standard of proof in civil cases because society "view[s] it as no more serious in
general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant's favor than for there to be an
erroneous verdict in the plaintiff's favor." Id. at 371 (Harlan, J., concurring). On the other
hand, the reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases is based on the belief that "the social
disutility of convicting an innocent man [is not] equivalent to the disutility of acquitting
someone who is guilty." Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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the jury may have entertained a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt had the error not been committed.'3
CONCLUSION
In New York and in the federal courts, there still exists a
"wayward course of harmless error."'38 While the courts recognize
that constitutional error must be harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt before a conviction can be affirmed, their analytical methods
for determining harmlessness are not consistent. 37 The inconsisten-
cies may be the result of ambiguous language in the Supreme Court
decisions, the failure on the part of appellate courts to discriminate
carefully among harmless error tests, or even the temptation not to
reverse convictions when a court believes guilt is clearly established.
Application of the reasonable possibility test to constitutional
and nonconstitutional errors would enhance "the respect and con-
fidence of the community in applications of the criminal law,' ' 38
and provide defendants every reasonable doubt before they are de-
prived of life or liberty. The principle that a defendant must be tried
by his peers requires that appellate courts refrain from retrying
cases and judging the guilt or innocence of a defendant. As recog-
nized in legislative enactments and judicially created tests, the con-
cept of harmless error was intended only to prevent reversals based
upon technical and trivial errors. 39 Today, however, such reversals
have been virtually eliminated, 0 and a trend has developed in
which errors are deemed harmless if the trial court reached the
correct result. "' The direction of the harmless error doctrine, it is
125 Justice Traynor advocates a "high probability" standard for constitutional and non-
constitutional error in both civil and criminal cases. R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 26-30, 35,
48. In Justice Traynor's view the reasonable possibility test is too strict; a test less exacting
than the high probability standard, however, carries "too great a risk of affirming a judg-
ment that was influenced by error." Id. at 35-36.
'u Id. at 13.
See notes 96-103 supra.
11- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
23 See People v. Ross, 67 Cal. 2d 64, 76 & n.8, 429 P.2d 606, 618-20 & n.8, 60 Cal. Rptr.
254, 266-68 & n.8 (1967) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Ross v. California, 391
U.S. 470 (1968) (per curiam); note 9 supra.
"I When the wisdom of harmless error statutes was debated, the reformers presented
examples of the types of error they considered detrimental: One court had held that reversal
was required when the word 'the' was mistakenly omitted from the indictment. State v.
Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 203, 109 S.W. 706, 707 (1908); see People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal. 406,
406 (1880). Today, of course, such errors do not warrant reversal. See, e.g., People v. Cun-
ningham, 64 App. Div. 2d 722, 406 N.Y.S.2d 899 (3d Dep't 1978); People v. Esteves, 95 Misc.
2d 70, 406 N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
" See, e.g., People v. Wander, 61 App. Div. 2d 1037, 403 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d Dep't 1978).
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submitted, should be shifted by the use of a precise and exacting
standard. An increase in reversals seems a reasonable price to pay
to ensure fair trials"' and to preserve the integrity of the Consti-
tution and rules governing criminal trials.
Fred P. Boy, Iff
2 R. TRAYNOR, supra note 4, at 22, 80-81; cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
(reasonable doubt standard at trial level "indispensible to command the respect and confid-
ence of the community"). It has been suggested that use of the reasonable doubt standard at
the appellate level would serve to undermine respect for the criminal justice system because
it is unduly stringent. See 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 373, 388-89 (1975). The reasonable possibility
test, however, is applicable only to errors which affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Since it is not applicable to technical errors its use would not impair the original purpose of
harmless error statutes - to avoid reversals in cases involving technical errors. See note 139
supra.
